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POLICY ISSUES IN HEALTH
ALLIANCES: OF EFFICIENCY,
MONOPSONY, AND EQUITY
Henry T. Greelyt
"Marley was dead; to begin with. There is no doubt
whatever about that. The register of his burial was signed by
the clergyman, the clerk, the undertaker and the chief
mourner. Scrooge, signed it:... Old Marley was dead as a
door-nail." 
AND SO IS THE HEALTH SECURITY ACT, the Clinton
administration's ambitious plan to reform the American
health care financing system, and with it, the mandatory health
alliances that were to play the crucial role in implementing the
Act. In February 1994, at the time of the conference from
which this symposium issue is drawn, mandatory health alli-
ances under the Clinton health reform proposal could have
been characterized, to shift centuries, as on life support and the
Clinton plan itself in serious condition. By now, the figurative
plug has been pulled on both mandatory alliances and on any
meaningful health reform. Of course, the problems that
sparked the health reform efforts are alive and well, leaving all
Americans who are paying attention to wonder "what next?"
This Article attempts to explore the future of one vital
part of the Clinton plan for universal health coverage - health
alliances.2 It argues, perhaps surprisingly, that in one form or
t Professor of Law, Stanford University. I would like to thank the participants in the
Case Western Reserve University Law-Medicine Center Symposium, National Health
Care Reform: The Legal Issues, particularly Professors Max Mehlman, Eleanor Kinney,
and Clark Havighurst. I also would like to thank my research assistant, Erik Olson, and
the financial support of the Claire and Michael Brown Estate.
1. CHARLES DICKENS. A CHRISTMAS CAROL I (Holiday House, 1983) (1843).
2. This Article addresses health coverage rather than health insurance because
health coverage for employees, more often than not, is now provided through mechanisms
other than "insurance." More than 40 million Americans now receive coverage through
health maintenance organizations (HMOs), which do not "insure" consumers but contract
to provide them directly with medical services. Tens of millions more Americans receive
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another, alliances should have a bright future. These alliances
may be mandatory or voluntary, governmental or private, but
they will continue to spread as ways for purchasers of health
insurance to band together to get better coverage for their
money. Health alliances offer too many advantages of too many
different kinds to disappear.
Alliances also raise thorny questions that cannot be ig-
nored. Health alliances have attracted support from three very
different camps: those interested in them for efficiency, for mo-
nopsony, and for equity. For those interested solely in effi-
ciency, health alliances are essentially purchasing cooperatives
that allow small buyers to benefit from the economies of scale
in bargaining and in implementation that are available to large
purchasers of health coverage. For those interested in monop-
sony, health alliances are able to extort lower prices out of the
sellers of health coverage by controlling a large number of the
purchasers. For those interested in equity, health alliances are
attractive because they offer all consumers within the same al-
liance access to the same coverage choices. These three differ-
ent conceptions have different implications for how health alli-
ances should be structured.
This Article will take three somewhat separate looks at
health alliances (HAs). First, it will explain the background of
HAs, their definition, and their history. This section will de-
scribe in some detail how HAs were supposed to operate under
the Clinton Health Security Act (the HSA or the bill). Second,
it will add a bit of empirical evidence to the discussion of HAs
by describing two existing entities that operate like health alli-
ances, the California Public Employee Retirement System
(PERS) health benefits system and the Health Insurance Plan
of California (HIPC). These examples may be useful to anyone
interested in the topic. Third, this Article will analyze four dif-
ficult issues concerning HAs: bureaucracy, geography, health
cost control, and governance. The analysis will focus on HAs
coverage through employers who "self-insure." In these cases, the employers pay the cov-
ered health bills themselves, though usually with administrative help from an expert in
health coverage, which is often an insurer. Pure "insurance," where an outside party agrees
to reimburse a consumer for health coverage expenses the consumer has chosen and paid
for, is increasingly rare. For a discussion of the somewhat surprising nature of the current
market for private health coverage, see Henry T. Greely, The Regulation of Private
Health Insurance, in HEALTH CARE CORPORATE LAW: FORMATION AND REGULATION 8-1,
8-13 (Mark Hall ed., 1993).
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under the Clinton plan, but also will try to illuminate some
more fundamental issues. Finally, this Article will offer some
thoughts on the future of HAs.3
I. HEALTH ALLIANCES IN THE CLINTON HEALTH
PLAN
The intellectual underpinnings of health alliances start
with Professor Alain Enthoven and the so-called Jackson Hole
group of health policy analysts. In two influential articles, pub-
lished in January 1989 in the New England Journal of
Medicine, Enthoven argued that health care should be provided
through mandatory employer participation in what he called
"Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives."4 These coopera-
tives, nicknamed HIPCs (pronounced "hip'-icks") would be
3. Even though they had a central role in the HSA, there has been surprisingly little
detailed discussion of HAs as envisioned by that bill. The best discussion was in a short
pamphlet by Clark C. Havighurst, REMAKING HEALTH ALLIANCES (Am. Enterprise Inst.
1994), which explored some of the problems of controlling HAs. See also HENRY N. BUT-
LER. UNHEALTHY ALLIANCES: BUREAUCRATS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND POLITICIANS IN
HEALTH REFORM (1994).
Before the HSA was completed, a useful discussion of the structure and roles of HAs
took place in the journal Health Affairs. It published four short articles entirely on HAs
under the title Perspectives: Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives, including Walter
A. Zelman, Who Should Govern the Purchasing Cooperative?, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993,
at 49; Paul Starr, Design of Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives, HEALTH AFF.,
Supp. 1993, at 58; James C. Robinson, A Payment Method for Health Insurance Purchas-
ing Cooperatives, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 65; and Shoshanna Sofaer, Informing and
Protecting Consumers under Managed Competition, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 76.
(Both Zelman and Starr played major roles in drafting the HSA). The issue also contained
useful discussions of some of the issues involved in HAs in Paul Starr & Walter A.
Zelman, A Bridge to Compromise: Competition Under a Budget, HEALTH AFF., Supp.
1993, at 7; Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition,
HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 24, and Richard Kronick, Where Should the Buck Stop:
Federal and State Responsibilities in Health Care Financing Reform, HEALTH AFF., Supp.
1993, at 87.
There has been very little discussion of HAs in the law review literature. The most
useful article is probably Janet L. McDavid, Antitrust Issues in Health Care Reform, 43
DEPAUL L. REv. 1045 (1994). Issues in consumer protection, particularly of minorities,
under HAs are explored in Vernellia R. Randall, Does Clinton's Health Care Reform Pre-
posal Ensure Equality to Health Care for Ethnic Americans and the Poor?, 60 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 167 (1994). Both of those law review issues, along with 29 WAKE FOREST L.
REv., Issue I, contain symposia on the Clinton Health plan, featuring a wide range of
useful analyses of the HSA. Many of these articles discuss HAs in passing, but do not
focus on them.
4. See generally Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health
Plan for the 1990's: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality
and Economy (pts. I & 2), 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 29, 94 (1989) (proposing a universal
health insurance plan mandating coverage by employers of full-time employees).
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large enough to function as efficient purchasers and monitors of
health coverage. The HIPC idea, after further elaboration by
the Jackson Hole group, became part of the Clinton adminis-
tration's HSA, as unveiled in October 1993.1 HIPCs, renamed
as the presumably less-intimidating Health Alliances, were cru-
cial to the Clinton plan.6 Although no bills similar to the
Health Security Act seem likely to be enacted in the near fu-
ture, I will discuss HAs as defined in that bill in some detail, as
the bill provides the most detailed implementation of the idea
of mandatory health alliances available.
Under the Health Security Act, all Americans currently
covered by Medicaid, all self-employed or unemployed Ameri-
cans, and almost all Americans with an employee in the family
would get health coverage through an HA. Only two groups of
people would not. First, the roughly thirty-five to forty million
Americans eligible for Medicare and a few other smaller fed-
eral programs would continue to receive their existing cover-
age.' (In the future, newly eligible Medicare members would
be allowed to keep their HA-provided coverage if they chose.)
Second, private employers with more than 5000 employees and
existing union-based "multi-employer plans" with more than
5000 active participants could choose to set up their own sys-
tems, called "corporate alliances." 8 Families with members
covered by such corporate alliances may not have been covered
by an HA, although some of these families could have opted to
5. The principles behind the Health Security Act were announced in September
1993. The White House released an incomplete text of the bill on October 27, 1993, before
it actually had been introduced in Congress. The White House periodically announced
changes in the details of the bill, or floated possible changes, over the next several months.
For the most part, this Article will describe the HSA as of October 1993.
6. The bill actually used the term "health alliance" to refer to both the state-created
"regional alliances" and the employer- and union-created "corporate alliances." See H.R.
3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 1301, 1311 (1993) [hereinafter HSA].
7. Individuals eligible for Medicare (generally those who are over 65, permanently
disabled, or diagnosed with end-stage renal disease) would continue to receive health bene-
fits through Medicare. Id. § 1001(d). Military personnel and their families could choose to
be covered by a Uniformed Services Health Plan of the Department of Defense, id.
§ 1004(b)(l); veterans and their families could choose a veterans health plan, id.
§ 1004(b)(2); and those eligible to enroll in the health program of the Indian Health Ser-
vice could continue to receive that coverage, Id. § 1004(b)(3). In addition, prisoners were
to receive health care through the authority responsible for the prisoner. Id. § 1001(e).
8. Id. § 1311(b). The union plans had to be in existence as of September 1, 1993.
Rural electric cooperatives and rural telephone cooperative associations also could consti-
tute corporate alliances if they were offering health benefits as of September 1, 1993 and
had more than 5000 employees entitled to health benefits under the plan.
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be covered through an HA through a family member employed
by a smaller company. The exact number of large employers
and unions that would have established such plans, and the
number of individuals they would have covered, cannot be de-
termined, but it seems very unlikely to have exceeded fifty mil-
lion people. Thus, somewhere between 165 and 215 million
Americans would have received their health coverage through
an HA.
Under the Clinton plan, states would have participated in
the HA system in one of three formats. A state could make its
HAs part of the executive branch of the state government, an
independent state agency, or a non-profit non-governmental or-
ganization. 9 Whichever option the state would choose, the HA
had to be governed by a board of directors.' 0 The directors
were to be equally divided between representatives of employ-
ers and representatives of individuals. No one working in the
health care industry, or closely related to someone working in
that industry, could serve on these boards, but each HA would
be required to have a separate medical advisory board.'
Each participating state would have to establish at least
one HA. No HAs could cross state lines."2 States could estab-
lish multiple HAs and set their borders, but with several limita-
tions. Each part of the state had to be within the territory of
one HA,' 3 no part of the state could be within the territory of
more than one HA,'4 and each HA would have to cover a pop-
ulation large enough to give the HA an adequate market share
to negotiate effectively.' 5 In setting the boundaries of HAs, a
9. The Clinton bill did not require a state to participate in the system, thus avoiding
possible legal attacks under the Tenth Amendment. The bill, however, provided such strong
incentives for a state to participate that it seems highly unlikely any state would, in fact,
have opted out.
States also were given the option of creating a state-wide "single-payer system," which
would preempt the HA system. Id. §§ 1221-1223. A state was also allowed to create an
"alliance-specific single-payer system," in which case the HA would exist, but would differ
in some important respects from the "single-payer system." Id. § 1224. Neither of these
options will be discussed in this Article.
10. Id. § 1302(a).
11. Id. § 1302(b),(c).
12. States were, however, authorized to allow or require HAs to coordinate their
activities within a state or between states. Id. § 1202(c).
13. Id. § 1202(b)(6).
14. Id. § 1202(b)(3).
15. Id. § 1202(b)(2)(A). Section 1202(b)(2)(B) provided a safe harbor as to
§ 1202(b)(2)(A) by providing that if an alliance includes all the portion of a Consolidated
1995]
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state could not "discriminate on the basis of or otherwise take
into account race, ethnicity, language, religion, national origin,
socio-economic status, disability, or perceived health status." 16
Furthermore, no part of a "metropolitan statistical area" con-
tained in the state could be divided into more than one HA.1 7
A state's failure to abide by these rules in setting up the alli-
ances apparently could be challenged by the National Health
Board, 8 or in a private action under section 1983.11
Under the bill, an HA would have four major functions:
(1) negotiating with health plans and providers, (2) ensuring
the enrollment of all eligible individuals and families, (3) creat-
ing and regulating information provided to consumers about
their options, and (4) collecting and analyzing data on the
quality of care delivered by contracting health plans. In addi-
tion, HAs would issue "health security cards,"20 create an
Metropolitan Statistical Area that is within the state, it is presumed to meet the adequate
population requirement.
16. Id. § 1202(b)(4).
17. Id. § 1202(b)(5). The Office of Management and Budget designates geographi-
cal regions as "metropolitan areas." It divides these "metropolitan areas" into three cate-
gories: "metropolitan statistical areas" [hereinafter MSA], "primary metropolitan statisti-
cal areas" [hereinafter PMSA], and "consolidated metropolitan statistical areas"
[hereinafter CMSA]. CMSAs are large urban areas, made up for a number of different
PSMAs. MSAs are only those metropolitan areas that are not part of a CMSA. US DEP'T
OF COMMERCE. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. app. II at 926 (1994). For example,
the New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA CMSA, the country's
largest with a population of over 19 million, is made up of 15 PMSAs: Bergen-Paddaic NJ,
PMSA; Bridgeport, CT PMSA; Danbury, CT PMSA; Dutchess County, NY PMSA;
Jersey City, NJ PMSA; Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ PMSA; Monmouth-Ocean,
NJ PMSA; Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA; New Haven-Meriden CT PMSA; New York, NY
PMSA Newark, NJ PMSA; Newburgh, NY-PA PMSA; Stamford-Norwalk, CT PMSA;
Trenton, NJ PMSA; and Waterbury, CT PMSA. Id. at 933.
Although the large CMSA and its 15 constituents are each "metropolitan areas," as
defined by the Office of Management and Budget, none of them is a "metropolitan statisti-
cal area," the term used in the HSA. It seems likely the drafters intended to refer to both
PMSAs and MSAs. There are 250 MSAs in the country, mainly in smaller areas, as com-
pared with 73 PMSAs which combine to form 18 CMSAs. Id. at 926. According to the
early explanation of the HSA, released as comments on the Preliminary Working Group
Draft in September 1993, alliances were not to split PMSAs. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S
HEALTH CARE REFORM PROPOSAL - PRELIMINARY WORKING GROUP DRAFT OF SEPTEM-
BER 7. 1993, reprinted in PRESIDENT CLINTON'S HEALTH CARE REFORM PROPOSAL AND
HEALTH SECURITY ACT, (CCH) app. at A-19 (1993).
18. Under this section of the proposed bill, the National Health Board presumably
would have to approve the HA boundaries as part of its approval of the state health care
system as a whole. HSA § 1511(a) (1993).
19. Id. § 5235.
20. Id.§ 1324.
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ombudsman's office,21 and collect data and analyze the quality
of care provided. 22 Under some circumstances, the HAs also
would encourage the creation or expansion of health plans in
their service areas.2 3 The HAs would play a relatively minor
role in the implementation of premium and expenditure caps as
imposed by the National Health Board. 4
Perhaps the most important duty of HAs would be to ne-
gotiate with health plans and providers. These negotiations
would lead to a set of options from which individual members
of the HAs would choose their health coverage. The bill would
require HAs to negotiate with any willing state-certified health
plan and would not allow them to negotiate with any plan that
did not have state certification. 5 HAs were not required to of-
fer a contract to any prepaid plan whose premium was more
than 120 % of the weighted-average premium within the HA or
that had failed to comply with previous contracts. 6 In addition,
at least one of the plans offered by the HA had to be a "fee-
for-service" plan.27 Under the bill, HAs would negotiate a fee
schedule that would govern the payments the HA (and the cor-
porate alliances in its region) would make under the fee-for-
service option.2 8 Special provisions were made to allow provid-
ers to negotiate such a fee schedule with the HAs while en-
joying some protection under the "state action" doctrine from
the federal antitrust laws.29 The only express limitation on HAs
in negotiating these contracts and payment schedules would be
that HAs could not bear any "insurance risk."30
21. Id. § 1326(a).
22. Id. § 1327.
23. Id. § 1329(b). The HAs were also to be associated with an administrative
claims process for considering consumer or provider claims against health plans with which
they contract. This claims process, set out in HSA §§ 5202-5204 and §§ 5211-5214,
would involve "complaint review offices" established by the states for each HA. It is not
clear from the bill whether these offices would, or could, be part of the HAs.
24. Id. § 6012.
25. Id. § 1321(a)(1).
26. Id. § 1321(b).
27. Id. § 1322(c). As part of the fee-for-service schedule, the HAs would be allowed
to create a "global budget" for the fee-for-service plan. Id. § 1322(d). The HAs also would
restrict coverage through utilization review, pre-certification, and exclusion of low quality
providers. Id. § 1322(b)(2)(B).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 1322(c)(2).
30. Id. § 1329(c).
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HAs also would be responsible for ensuring that every eli-
gible person living in their geographical areas was enrolled."1
This includes enrolling family members and new residents, as
well as providing for "point-of-service" enrollment for eligible
people who presented themselves for covered services without
being enrolled.32 It also includes a requirement that the HA
hold an annual "open enrollment" period to allow its members
to change plans, as well as authorization for the HA to allocate
membership in any of its plans that is oversubscribed.33
HAs would play a major role in informing their members
about health plans. The HAs themselves would be required to
make specific information available to their members that "al-
lows such enrollees . . . to make valid comparisons among
health plans offered by the alliance." 4 In addition, the HAs
would have to approve the distribution of any marketing mater-
ials used by the health plans.3 5
Finally, HAs would play a major role as financial in-
termediaries. They were to collect funds from employers, cov-
ered individuals and families, and governments, and then dis-
tribute those funds to health plans and providers. They were
also to calculate the premiums to be paid by employers and
members, based on the bids submitted by their health plans,
and they were responsible for calculating the subsidies, phrased
in the bill as a "reduction in cost sharing," available to lower
income families in their region.3 6
To carry out their functions, HAs would be authorized to
include an "administrative allowance" in the premiums to be
collected. 7 This allowance could not exceed 2.5 % of an HA's
total estimated revenues.3 8
But what would these HAs have looked like in practice?
Much depends on whether the state chose to structure them as
part of the state executive branch, as independent state agen-
cies, or as non-profit non-governmental organizations. Much
more depends on the political choices of the state of whom to
31. Id. § 1323.
32. Id. § 1323(a), (b).
33. Id. § 1323(c).
34. Id. § 1325(a)(1).
35. Id. § 1325(b).
36. Id. §§ 1131-1136.
37. Id. § 1352.
38. Id. § 1352(c).
[Vol. 5:37
POLICY ISSUES IN HEALTH ALLIANCES
appoint as directors, and whom to use as staff. Whatever the
formal structure, the actual workings and decisions of an HA
in California, a huge state with an enormous managed care in-
dustry, would be likely to look very different from an HA in
Indiana, a medium-sized state with a powerful medical
profession.39
One thing is clear: these health alliances would deal with
vast amounts of money. Los Angeles County, for example, is
one Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area and so presumably
would have to be included in one HA. It is home to just under
nine million people, of whom more than seven million would
likely be covered by the HA. If it existed today, the annual
revenues of that HA would be about $12 to $15 billion, dwarf-
ing the budgets of the City of Los Angeles, about $3.4 billion
in 1991,0 and the County of Los Angeles, about $9.3 billion in
1990-91.41 Indeed, the budget for that HA would be 20% to
30 % of the entire budget for the State of California. And, if it
received the maximum 2.5 % administrative allowance, the HA
would have about $300 to $375 million per year to sustain it-
self. That HA might be the largest in the country, but even
HAs in small states would be rich and powerful institutions in
the context of their states.42 As sources of jobs, money, and
power, HAs under the Clinton plan would likely be extremely
attractive politically.
II. TWO EXISTING MODELS FOR HEALTH
ALLIANCES
The HSA would have written into federal law a detailed
set of duties and powers for HAs. No HAs of that type exist, or
could now exist absent authorizing federal legislation. Nonethe-
less, there are prototypes for HAs. One common prototype ex-
ists where an employer negotiates with different health plans
39. 1 owe this insight to Professor Eleanor Kinney, of Indiana University/Purdue
University at Indianapolis Law School, who brought these differences forcefully home to
me.
40. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 17, at 312.
41. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY GOVERNMENT FINANCES: 1990-1991, at 9
(1993).
42. North Dakota, for example, a state of about 640,000 people, might opt for a
single, statewide HA. That HA would have annual revenues of about $1 billion and a
maximum administrative allowance of $25 million, in a state whose total budget in 1992
was about $1.5 billion. Id. at 19.
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and offers its employees choices among them.4 s But some proto-
types exist that cover employees in many different firms.44 I
will discuss two such prototypes in California: The California
Public Employee Retirement System and the Health Insurance
Plan of California.
A. The California Public Employee Retirement System
(PERS) 45
PERS was founded as the State Employee Retirement
System in January 1932. Since then, it has grown to be one of
the three largest pension plans in the world, with assets of more
than $79 billion."6 It invests funds and pays pensions for most
current and retired employees of the State of California and for
employees of those local governments in California that have
chosen to join it. In that role, it has become famous in recent
years because of its assertive posture as a very large institu-
tional investor. In 1962, its duties were expanded beyond pen-
sions to provide health insurance to state employees and, since
1967, to cover employees of participating local governments.' 7
43. For example, for most of its employees, my employer, Stanford University, has
negotiated contracts this year with three HMOs. It also provides a self-insured plan, ad-
ministered by Blue Shield of California, which combines aspects of an HMO, a Preferred
Provider Organization (PPO), and a fee-for-service plan. The University pays for 90% of
the lowest cost plan for each eligible employee; the employee is encouraged to choose one
of the four plans and pays the remaining cost herself. In effect, the University has acted as
an HA for its roughly 9000 employees, negotiating with several different plans, providing
employees information about the plans, offering employees an annual choice among the
plans, and monitoring plan performance.
44. There are still other health plans that cover many employers that could perhaps
be viewed as prototypes for HAs. Multi-employer health plans are run by labor unions on
behalf of their members, who are employed by a number of employers. These could be
viewed as forms of HAs, although in those cases members of the "alliance" have union
membership in common which, particularly in crafts unions, is likely to be longer lasting
than a relationship to any one employer. There are other forms of multiple employer health
plans without a union basis, such as church or professional organization plans, but they do
not resemble health alliances.
45. I am currently a member of the Health Benefits Advisory Board for PERS. This
membership has been a source of valuable information about PERS; it also may have led to
subconscious bias.
46. Letter from Thomas Elkin, Assistant Executive Officer, PERS, to author (Dec.
21, 1994) [hereinafter Elkin Letter] (on file with Health Matrix: Journal of Law-
Medicine).
47. CALIFORNIA PERS. BOARD MEMBER HANDBOOK 5 (April 1991). These duties
now extend to agencies that do not use PERS for retirement purposes, but want to use it
for health benefits.
[Vol. 5:37
POLICY ISSUES IN HEALTH ALLIANCES
PERS currently provides health coverage for about 965
different employers, ranging in size from the State of Califor-
nia to the two-person Mojave Mosquito Abatement District."8
PERS plans cover about 900,000 Californians, about 3% of
the State's population."9 In 1994, it will spend about $1.6 bil-
lion for their health coverage.50
Statewide, PERS currently contracts with eighteen differ-
ent HMOs.5" It provides two self-insured fee-for-service plans,
administered on its behalf by Blue Shield of California.52 It
also provides four small so-called "association plans" for cer-
tain groups of employees. 53 About 74% of PERS members are
enrolled in HMOs, 22% are enrolled in the two self-insured
plans, and the remaining 4 % are in the association plans.5 4 The
two HMOs with the most PERS members are the Northern
California and Southern California regions of Kaiser Health
Plan.55 Combined, they cover a little more than 40 % of PERS
members, and PERS members make up about one-tenth of
their California membership.58
The extent of a PERS member's choice will vary with her
location. In some less populated regions of the state, few op-
tions may be available. In the Los Angeles and the San Fran-
cisco Bay Areas, however, the home to the majority of the
State's population, a PERS member has a choice of more than
ten different health plans including the two Preferred Provider
Organizations (PPOs). 5
PERS is an agency of the State of California, though it
has limited independence from the executive branch of the
state government. It is run by a large and politically chosen
Board of Trustees, who, by statute, are required to represent a
48. Elkin letter, supra note 46.
49. Susan Duerkson, State Health Reform: Preview and Remedy Insurance Pool is
Option for Small Firms, SAN DIEGO TIMES, October 27, 1993, at A-1.
50. Elkin letter, supra note 46.
51. FOSTER HIGGINS. THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM
MEDICAL PLAN EXIT SURVEY RESULTS - REPORT OF FINDINGS 19 (November 1993) (on
file with author).
52. Elkin letter, supra note 46.
53. See FOSTER HIGGINS, supra note 51, at 20.
54. Id. at 19.
55. Id. at 21.
56. Id.; see Elkin letter, supra note 46.
57. Id.
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variety of interests." The health benefits staff totals about
ninety people, with an annual budget of around $8 million.
That is about $8 per person per year, or about 0.5 % of its total
health coverage expenditures. 9
PERS has had the time and staff to analyze health plan
bids and bargain effectively, and, in recent years, it has been
willing to be aggressive. In 1992, when its largest HMO, the
Kaiser Health Plan, failed to keep its 1993 premium to what
PERS considered an acceptable level, PERS froze Kaiser
membership. PERS members who were Kaiser members could
remain in that system, but no PERS member, new or existing,
could join Kaiser. Kaiser's premium increase the following year
was acceptable.60
In the fall of 1993, PERS announced that it wanted a 5 %
reduction in premiums from all the HMOs it contracted with,
without any allowance for inflation. It ultimately gained an
overall reduction of 1 %, in a year when health coverage premi-
ums throughout California and the nation continued to rise.
This reduction brought the total premium increase for 1992
through 1994 for PERS to 6%, well under the 30% increase
experienced by the average California employer. 1
Interestingly, although PERS has long been a major factor
in California's health coverage markets, it began to play this
aggressive role only recently. As California's economy fell into
recession around 1990, the State experienced (and continues to
experience) severe budget crises. In 1991, as part of the re-
58. FOSTER HIGGINS, supra note 51, at 9-10. The PERS board has 13 members: one
member of the State Personnel Board; the Director of the State Department of Personnel
Administration; the State Controller; the State Treasurer; an official of a life insurer, ap-
pointed by the governor; an elected official from a local government agency that belongs to
PERS, appointed by the governor; a public representative, appointed jointly by the Speaker
of the Assembly and the Senate Rules Committee; two members elected by all PERS
members; one member elected by state employee members of PERS; one member elected
by school district members of PERS; one member elected by PERS members employed by
non-school district local government agencies; and one member elected by retirement mem-
bers of PERS. Id.
59. The premiums PERS charges participating employers includes a 0.5% adminis-
trative charge. The budget noted in the text undoubtedly does not capture the full cost of
the health benefits operations. For example, it does not include any share of the general
PERS overhead, some portion of which should be allocated to the health coverage opera-
tions. Nevertheless, the full cost of its health coverage operations is unlikely to be much
higher. Elkin letter, supra note 46.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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sponse to budget problems, the State froze the contribution it
would make to employee health insurance. Any premium in-
crease from one year to the next would be paid entirely by em-
ployees. This experience seems to have created the political will
for PERS to drive hard bargains with its health plans.62
It is possible that PERS has been successful merely
through encouraging health plans to shift costs. That is, for
every dollar premiums to PERS are reduced, premiums to
other employers may be increased. PERS has tried to go be-
yond cost-shifting to encourage health plans to change how
they provide care. For example, the PERS board recently
passed a resolution supporting, in principle, the decision of one
of its health plans to restrict a high cost intervention of limited
value on, in part, cost-benefit grounds. 63 It has also recently
required all the HMOs it contracts with to standardize the
benefit packages they offer to PERS members.6 4 In that way,
members will be able to choose among plans on the basis of
price and perceived quality, without being forced to try to cal-
culate, for example, whether one plan's higher copayment was
counterbalanced by another plan's coverage of durable medical
equipment.
PERS also has been active in assessing the quality of both
care and service provided by its contracting plans. It has been
collecting information about utilization and quality from its
health plans for several years.6 5 It has used this quality infor-
mation in the past in its negotiating, asking one plan, for exam-
ple, why PERS members enrolled in it had a much higher rate
of caesarian sections than other members.66 It is now requiring
all its plans to submit quality information based on a nationally
developed questionnaire called HEDIS: Health Evaluation
62. Credit is also due to Professor Alain Enthoven, one of the architects of the ideas
of managed competition and HAs. Several years ago, Enthoven became Chair of the PERS
Health Benefits Advisory Board, and, in that role, has encouraged PERS to assert itself in
the market. See Thomas S. Mulligan, State Campaigns for its Health Coverage Plan, L.A.
TIMES, May 18, 1993, at Al (describing Professor Enthoven as a key designer of the state's
managed competition model).
63. Elkin letter, supra note 46.
64. Id.
65. See FOSTER HIGGINS, supra note 51 (summarizing the exit survey results, data,
tables, questionnaires, and comments about medical plans and member satisfaction).
66. Elkin letter, supra note 46.
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Data Information System.67 The information collected about
quality of care will then be passed on to PERS members.
PERS also collects and distributes information on its
members' satisfaction with their health plans. PERS members
are sampled every two years to determine their satisfaction
with their health plans. The results are made available during
the open enrollment period to all PERS members. Similarly,
each year, all PERS members who switch from one plan to
another - 18,000 in 1993 - are surveyed to determine the
reasons for their changes.68
PERS differs in important ways from the HAs envisioned
by the Clinton plan. Membership in PERS is not mandatory
for governmental employers. Many local employers and even
some units of the State government, such as the University of
California, have chosen not to be covered by it. And PERS has
a substantially smaller market share than the Clinton HAs
would have. It covers about 3 % of the population of its region,
compared with an estimated 65 % to 85 % percent for the HAs
proposed in the Clinton plan. In spite of these differences, it
appears to have been effective in improving the choices availa-
ble to its members and at a low cost. It is impossible to deter-
mine how effective PERS has been, but it is clearly very
promising.
B. The Health Insurance Plan of California (HIPC)
The Health Insurance Plan of California was created by
legislation proposed by Governor Wilson and passed in 1992; it
began operation in July 1993.69 The so-called Plan is actually a
health coverage purchasing agent for small employers, modeled
on (and named in light of) the Jackson Hole Group's Health
Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives.
Employers are eligible to purchase coverage through
HIPC if they employed at least four and not more than fifty
employees for at least fifty percent of the previous three
months.70 All eligible employees must work a normal work
67. Id.
68. FOSTER HIGGINS, supra note 51, at 1-2.
69. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 53201 (West 1994) (proposed as Assembly Bill 1672).
70. The statute set the initial qualifying size at between 5 and 50 employees. For
1994-95, it required HIPC to cover companies with only four employees; in 1995-96, this
floor is scheduled to drop to three employees. Susan D. Odom, California's New Health-
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week of at least thirty hours and at least half of them must be
employed in California.7' Employees can choose to purchase
coverage for their spouses and for unmarried children under
age twenty-three who live with the employee.72
Participating employers must pay, for each employee, at
least half of the lowest available employee-only rate for their
region, though they may pay up to 100% of that rate. If the
employer pays 100%, its coverage must extend to all eligible
employees; if the employer pays less than 100%, it only must
assure that at least 70% of the employees join. Employers
must recertify each year that they continue to meet most of the
small employer requirements.73
In 1994-95, HIPC has contracted with three PPOs and
twenty HMOs.74 The HMOs with which it contracts must offer
two relatively uniform packages, an "HMO Standard" package
and an "HMO Preferred" package.75 These differ mainly in
the size of the copayments required for specific services - for
example, the standard package includes a charge of $15.00 per
physician office visit, which the preferred package reduces to
$5 .00.7 Similarly, it contracts with three PPOs that must each
offer a PPO standard and PPO preferred plan.77 The standard
PPO package has a $500 deductible; the preferred package has
a $250 deductible.78
Employees of participating small employers can choose
among any health plans HIPC offers in their geographical
area, both when the firm initially joins HIPC and then, each
year, during an open enrollment month.7 9 Employers have no
discretion to limit the health plans offered, and the health plans
care Agenda, L.A. Bus. J., July 19, 1993; see also Renee Blankenaw, Designing HIPCs,
HosFs., July 20, 1993, at 34, 34-35.
71. HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN OF CALIFORNIA, THE HIPC EMPLOYER APPLICATION
3 (June 1993) [hereinafter HIPC EMPLOYER APPLICATION]. Employees from outside Cali-
fornia count toward the definition of "small business," but they cannot receive coverage
through HIPC. Id. In addition, employees who are covered through Medicare or through
another employer's health plan (such as a spouse's employer's plan) may waive participa-
tion and thus not be counted as "eligible employees." Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 5, 11, 30-50.
75. Id. at 9-10.
76. Id. at 9.
77. Id. at 10.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 7.
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have no discretion to reject any employer or any eligible em-
ployee, spouse, or dependent who seeks coverage, for medical or
other grounds.80
HIPC divides California into six regions and offers differ-
ent packages of plans, and different rates, in each region.8 1 The
number of choices available varies depending on where an em-
ployee lives. In a few isolated rural counties, employees have
only one or two choices. In most parts of the San Francisco
Bay area, an employee of a HIPC member employer has a
choice of three PPOs and nine to thirteen HMOs, each offering
both a standard and a preferred option. In Los Angeles
County, an employee could choose among the same three PPOs
and up to fifteen HMOs. Within one PPO or HMO, the premi-
ums charged vary with region, based on the employee's age, the
choice of standard or premium coverage, and the family option
chosen (employee only; employee and spouse; employee and de-
pendent children; and employee, spouse, and dependent
children) .82
HIPC is administered by a state agency called the Major
Risk Medical Insurance Board (MRMIB). MRMIB was estab-
lished as part of earlier health reform legislation to administer
two state-subsidized health insurance programs, one for unin-
sured pregnant women and one for people who were medically
uninsurable - those with preexisting conditions or health risks
that kept them from qualifying for most insurance.83 MRMIB,
an independent state board whose members are appointed by
the governor and the legislature, has a staff of thirteen people,
but contracts for most of the administration of both the medi-
cal risk pool and HIPC.8 4 By statute, HIPC is supposed to
break even by the end of its first year, based largely on a fee it
charges participating employees. For 1994-95, this fee is $20
per group per month, plus $2.50 per month per person, which
80. Id. at 4 (providing that there are no pre-existing condition exclusions for HMO
coverage, but HIPC PPOs may apply a limited six month pre-existing condition exclusion
period).
81. Id. at 12.
82. Id. at 13-24 (showing geographical plan coverage); id. at 25-31 (showing premi-
ums for different plans, options, and regions).
83. The Health Insurance Plan of California, 1994: Hearings on Health Care Re-
form Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (testimony of
Lesley Cummings, Deputy Director, MRMIB) [hereinafter HIPC Hearings].
84. Id.
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on average is about 3 % of the premium.8 5 For a group with
forty covered persons (participating employees, spouses, and
dependents), this would amount to $120 per month, or about
3 % of the total costs of the health coverage.
During HIPC's first year of operation, it grew to include
more than 3000 employers and more than 25,000 people.8 It
grew faster than expected, even during a period of relative
weakness in California's economy, as it had originally expected
to attract only 10,000 to 20,000 employees in its first year.8 7 Its
growth still gives it less than 1 % of the estimated 360,000
businesses and eight million people in California who could
qualify for HIPC.88
Perhaps more impressive than its size in employers is the
number of major insurers and HMOs that have contracted
with it. The HIPCs were part of a broader package of legisla-
tive insurance reforms that tightly regulated the small em-
ployer health insurance market. The legislation prohibited
plans from rejecting or canceling smaller employer groups, lim-
ited pre-existing conditions exclusions, and capped the maxi-
mum difference between health plans rates for small employers
and other employers.8 9 These reforms made participation in
HIPC attractive, as its rules were not notably more onerous
than those applicable in the rest of the market. It also pre-
vented HIPC from becoming the "dumping ground" for high
risk employees and employers who could not get insurance in
the private market.
There have been no detailed studies yet of HIPC. Accord-
ing to press accounts, HIPC estimates that employers pay
about 15% less for health benefits when they buy through
HIPC.90 Although there have been occasional complaints about
excessive bureaucracy, the press coverage has generally de-
85. HIPC EMPLOYER APPLICATION, supra note 71, at 4; HIPC Hearings, supra note
83.
86. Alfred G. Haggerty, California HIPC Bears Watching in 1994, NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER. LIFE & HEALTH/FIN. SERVICES, Jan. 10, 1994, at 3.
87. California Health Insurance Pool Getting Strong Surge of Applications, Health
Care Daily (BNA) (July 7, 1993), available in WESTLAW, 7/7/93 HCD.
88. California's Pioneer Alliance, SACRAMENTO BE, Oct. 14, 1993, at B6.
89. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 53201.
90. HIPC Hearings, supra note 83; Sherry Jacobson, A Plan with Promise: Texas
May Model Health Insurance Changes on Budding California Pooling Program, THE
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 24, 1994, at 1A. On the other hand, an insurance company
official interviewed by the Wall Street Journal estimated the savings at about 5%, based
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scribed happy employers and employees. One dark side to
HIPC, however, is that it has not expanded health coverage
very much. The great majority of employers who participate in
HIPC had previously provided health insurance to their em-
ployees in other ways. Only 20 % to 25 % of HIPC members -
about 8000 to 10,000 people - were previously uninsured. 91
III. FOUR ISSUES: BUREAUCRACY, GEOGRAPHY,
COST CONTROL, AND GOVERNANCE
HAs under the proposed Clinton plan were quickly at-
tacked as adding another massive federal bureaucracy. This in-
substantial but rhetorically powerful attack, coupled with the
very real interests threatened by HAs, led to a rapid decline in
political interest in mandatory HAs. The Clinton plan's model
for mandatory HAs did raise some real and important issues,
but those received little attention. This section of the Article
will look first at the concerns about bureaucracy, and then at
three harder issues: drawing the boundaries of HAs, helping
HAs control health care costs, and governing HAs. Although
the HSA provides the specific model for HAs in these analyses,
this Article also discusses other kinds of HAs.
A. Bureaucracy
The specter of vast new federal bureaucracies was used to
attack the Clinton plan's mandatory HAs.92 This picture was
greatly exaggerated - and not just because the HAs would be
state bureaucracies instead of federal ones. Increased bureau-
cracy can be attacked for its size and cost alone, or for how it
would function. Most of the opposition focused on size and
cost, not on functioning.93 In fact, because the HAs should pro-
largely on economies of scale in administering larger groups. Eugene Carlson, Mixed Re-
views for Health Care Plan Like Clintons, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 1993, at B!.
91. HIPC Hearings, supra note 83 (20%); Jacobson, supra, at IA (22%); 25,000
Californians Jump Into the Pool, BUSINESS WIRE, Dec. 16, 1993 (22%).
92. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Word for Word: The Health Care Papers; Now It Can Be
Told: The Task Force Was Bold, Naive and Collegial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1994, § 4, at
7 (criticizing the plan's cumbersome barriers to service and ineffective cost containment
proposals).
93. See, e.g., Spencer Rich, Benign Watchdog or Bureaucratic Beast? Health Care
Alliances in the Clinton Plan, WASH. POST, March 22, 1994, at Z10 (stating that Clinton's
health care alliances are "too big, too much government" and create too much uncer-
tainty); Lynn Wagner, Clinton's Plan is Nearly Dead, Ideas Still Alive, MODERN
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vide economies of scale in financing health coverage, the system
could well lead to fewer employees and less bureaucracy than
the status quo. On the other hand, they might function in a
somewhat more rigid and bureaucratic manner than does the
current system.
1. Size
The key to understanding the issue of bureaucracy is to
look at the net effects of mandatory HAs. HAs would have
been new governmental or quasi-governmental bodies. They
would necessarily have employed people in positions that do not
now exist. Those positions would have replaced existing posi-
tions with employers, insurers, and others. Instead of having
tens of thousands of employers as intermediaries between con-
sumers and health plans, the HAs (from 51 to, at most, about
200 in number) would be the intermediaries. Therefore, HAs
would make redundant many existing employees of employers
and health plans.
Employers would no longer need to hire staff to analyze
health plans, negotiate with health plans, and monitor the per-
formance of health plans. Nor would they need to have staff
members who help employees with their disputes with health
plans. At the same time, health plans would not have to hire
people to market their plans to tens of thousands of employers,
or staff to deal with each of those employers. They would, and
will, continue to have to deal with consumers as they do now,
but would have had to deal with far fewer intermediaries. Fur-
thermore, another entire level of intermediaries would have
been decimated. Insurance brokers would have lost all their ex-
isting business in health coverage. Each of their employees fo-
cusing on health insurance or health plans would have become
redundant.
And, finally, if the Clinton plan, with its mandatory alli-
ances, had worked as intended, it would have reduced the total
number of individual health plans around the country. Far
fewer insurance companies would offer health plans and far
fewer employers, even under the corporate alliance provisions
of the Clinton plan, would create their own self-insured plans.
HEALTHCARE, March 28, 1994, at 29 (criticizing incentives to curb spending under the
Clinton plan and health alliances as too bureaucratic, overly regulatory, and too large).
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The smaller number of health plans would be offering a much
smaller number of largely standardized benefit packages. By
reducing the number of health plans, the Clinton plan would
have reduced the administrative burden for hospitals, doctors'
offices, and other health care providers. As a result, although
some people would be new employees of these new HAs, more
people would lose their jobs working with the health care fi-
nancing system among employers, insurers, and health care
providers.
It is, of course, impossible to determine exactly how the
balance would be struck. It is instructive, however, to look at
PERS and HIPC. PERS provides health benefits for nearly one
million people with a staff of about ninety and an annual
budget of about $8 million; HIPC currently covers more than
25,000 people with a staff of thirteen people.94 PERS includes
more than 965 employers; HIPC covers more than 3000.95 It is
hard to imagine that those employers could deal with providing
health coverage for such small numbers.
It is true that HAs, as conceived in the Clinton plan,
would have both arranged health coverage for some companies
that do not provide coverage and performed some services that
existing employers, health plans, insurance brokers, and health
care providers do not always provide. The HAs would have
been required to provide and review consumer information that
is not always made available today. They also would have
monitored and publicized the quality of health plans in ways
that only a few employers now do. If those activities are benefi-
cial, however, they would be worth a few additional employees.
Thus, on close examination, the size aspect of the bureau-
cracy argument actually turns on its head. The HAs would
have led to the provision of more and better services by fewer
employees. There was much discussion of the effects of the
Clinton plan on employment, but few politicians acknowledged
that the HAs could lead to substantial job losses in the health
care financing industry.
94. See supra notes 48 and 85.
95. Id.
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2. "Bureaucratic" Functioning
Of course, bureaucracy means more than size and cost -
"bureaucratic" is an adjective with independent and pejorative
meaning. Some of the bureaucracy arguments against the Clin-
ton plan may have stemmed from fears that HA employees
would be more distant, difficult, and "bureaucratic" than em-
ployees who now deal with health financing.
That may well depend on which existing employees are
used for comparison. Big firms, those most likely today to pro-
vide health benefits, may well be as bureaucratic as the federal
government or other notorious bureaucracies. Small employers
may be less bureaucratic, though they also may be more
arbitrary.
Perceptions as a "bureaucracy" also would depend on how
well an HA is run. Whether HAs were "bureaucratic" bureau-
cracies would depend largely on the states. It should be possible
for an HA to function quickly, cheaply, and efficiently just as
PERS and HIPC have done so in California. Under the Clin-
ton plan, the number of tasks undertaken by HAs and the style
and efficiency with which they would have accomplished them
would almost certainly have varied markedly from state to
state.96 And even the theoretical advantages of economies of
scale could be lost if a state created too many small HAs or,
perhaps, one or more HAs that were too big - so large as to
create actual diseconomies of scale.
Still, however efficient the HAs are, it does seem likely
that a shift in responsibilities from employers and insurers to
the HAs would lead to some changes in the style of operation.
In part to prevent the reality or perception of favoritism, gov-
ernmental agencies would bend over backward to avoid exercis-
ing case-by-case discretion. It is often difficult for government
agencies to ignore rules, deadlines, or "details" that could be
winked at by the staff of an employer or a private health in-
surer. Of course, the other side of this coin is that government
96. Robin Toner, "Alliance" to Buy Health Care: Bureaucrat or Public Servant?,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993, at Al.
97. Earlier styles of government that took advantage of such discretion to make and
reward friends were largely replaced by good government reformers. But see GRANT MC-
CONNELL. PRIVATE POWER & AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 5 (1967) (noting that Congress op-
erates in part to give members opportunities for constituent service that will cement politi-
cal loyalties).
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staff, while following rules, may be less likely to try to exploit a
consumer, through, for example, denying or delaying a cover-
age claim, than the staff of a private employer or insurer.
Nonetheless, particularly at a time when the very word "gov-
ernment" has nearly become an expletive, the possible rigidity
of a new bureaucracy surely was an additional disadvantage to
the Clinton plan.
B. Geography
Geography poses interesting problems for HAs. At the
most basic level, drawing the boundaries of HAs necessarily
determines how large they would be, with implications for their
ability to capture economies of scale as well as their power to
act as effective monopsonists. But geography could have three
other important implications: it could affect whether HAs are
state or federal agencies, it could alter the costs of health care
for particular communities, and it could raise basic questions
about the nature of the health plan. Any new plan for HAs
should consider all three points.
1. State Power
A crucial aspect of the HSA was that it expressly confined
HAs to one state. This makes little sense in many employment
settings. An employer in Manhattan will almost necessarily
employ workers living, at least, in New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut. To divide one employment market into at least
three HAs would add unnecessarily to the complexity of the
system for the employer and divide employees in a somewhat
arbitrary manner.98 It would have made more sense to require
that all parts of metropolitan areas be kept in one HA, respect-
ing the economic connections within such an area. More than a
quarter of the country's population lies in metropolitan areas
that cross state lines. Of the nation's eighteen CSMAs, seven
that encompass more than fifty million people cross state lines.
An additional twenty-seven MSAs, with a combined population
of eighteen million people, also cross state lines.9
98. Of course, that division would not be unique to health care. Employees who work
in one place but live in different states face different income tax situations depending on
their state of residence.
99. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 17, at 919-25.
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Instead, the HSA expressly forbade interstate HAs. HAs
in neighboring states were encouraged to cooperate, but they
had to remain firmly under the control of their own state. This
result seemed to be a function of politics rather than policy.
Under the Clinton plan, HAs were creatures of the states,
to be created in one of three forms as a state chose and to be
controlled by states. 100 No interstate body could offer as much
power or patronage to state governments. If, for example, the
CSMA that includes New York City were to be treated as one
HA, it would cover large parts of New York, New Jersey, Con-
necticut, and a small slice of Pennsylvania. As such, it could
not be wholly under the control of any one state. Although an
interstate compact could resolve the difficulty, no one could as-
sure that the necessary compacts could be reached quickly or
easily. Moreover, in any event, a state government would gain
less power from a share of a compact authority than from com-
plete control over its own alliances.
If interstate HAs were to be created, a simpler solution
would have been to create some kind of entity operating under
federal authority, which would not rely on the agreement of the
states involved. That solution, however, would have created po-
litical headaches by adding "federal bureaucrats," as well as
losing whatever political goodwill from the state governments
that might have been created by a plan that gave them more
power.
If different states could be expected to serve, in their HAs,
as true "laboratories of democracy," the limitation of HAs to
one state, and hence one state's control, might have benefits
greater than the costs of splitting up a labor market. But al-
though the HSA gave states control over HAs, it was a grant
of power largely without express policy implications. The bene-
fits package, the subsidies, and the structure of the competitive
market were all set by federal law. Compared with Medicaid or
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), for exam-
ple, states would have almost no power to alter the programs
implemented by HAs. States could decide whether the HA
would be part of the state executive branch, an independent
state agency, or a nonprofit, non-governmental organization -
100. See HSA § 1202(b).
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and then could appoint its members - but the states could do
little to dictate the HA's activity.
To the extent that any power rests within the HA, it would
seem to have been the power of invisible discretion. Thus, in
negotiating prices with fee-for-service providers, an HA might
be aggressive or lax. The appointment of HA members by the
states in that case would be more than "mere" patronage, but
would, in all probability, result in HAs in some states that were
"captured" by provider interests, either physicians or hospitals.
There are some advantages to state-governed HAs. To the
extent that health plans are, and would continue to be, regu-
lated by the states, a state-based HA might be able to coordi-
nate better with those regulators. 01 These advantages, how-
ever, seem small when compared with the costs of breaking up
labor markets and encouraging industry capture. As events
played out, the political advantages of state-based HAs did no
discernible good to the Clinton plan. Future health reform pro-
posals should think seriously about CSMA-based HAs.
2. Changing Costs Between Regions
Under the Clinton plan, health plans must use community
rating within an HA region.' 0 Community rating would mean
not only that older and younger, male and female, and healthy
and sickly people would pay the same for health coverage, but
also that the residents of all parts of an HA would pay the
same amounts - and that residents of different HAs would
pay different amounts. The boundary between a high cost and
low cost HA could determine the payroll costs of employers
and the take-home pay of employees in important ways. Citing
gang violence, drug abuse, and "crack babies," some commen-
tators foresaw massive fights in state legislatures, with subur-
101. In such a case, however, it is worth noting that although all states "regulate"
hospitals, almost all states and the federal government have largely ceded their power to
the accreditation process of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organi-
zations (JCAHO), a private body controlled by providers and hospitals which almost al-
ways satisfies state requirements for hospital licensure. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 488.5 (1993)
(describing the effect of JCAHO accreditation).
102. HSA § 1101.
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ban representatives trying desperately to avoid having their
constituents in health alliances with the inner cities.103
In fact, the situation was more complicated. There is little
academic data on differences in health costs from region to re-
gion and most of the data that exist are drawn from Medicare.
Because Medicare covers predominantly the elderly, Medicare
data might yield different results from the Clinton plan since
the population to be covered by the Clinton plan would almost
entirely exclude the elderly. The market provides some infor-
mation about non-Medicare patients through the differences in
premiums charged by insurers in different parts of a state.
Those premiums, however, might reflect conditions other than
just the costs of providing health care, such as differences in
who the insurers cover - and do not cover - in different regions.
For example, the premiums charged by current health plans,
by definition, do not include the direct costs of serving the un-
insured. Differences in the uninsured population may skew the
current regional cost differences. Finally, even if good data ex-
isted about the current regional differences in the costs of care,
none of the current data could project the costs under a re-
formed system, where increased choices for consumers and new
competitive pressures for providers might lead to very different
patterns of health costs.
With all of these qualifications, the existing data do give
us a starting point. The Medicare studies and at least some
insurance industry premiums show a consistent pattern: cities
seem to be more expensive than suburbs or rural areas. 0 4 This
difference seems to come largely from different practice pat-
103. William J. Bennett & Vin Weber, Health Plan Is Flawed Prescription, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993 at A16; Tom Redburn, Conflict Is Set Between Regions in Health
Plan, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 5, 1993, at Al; Robin Toner, supra note 96, at Al.
104. The research has focused largely on understanding geographic variations in
medical costs in order to refine payments under Medicare. As a result, the data is almost
totally based on the health costs of the elderly; the health costs of those who would have
been covered by HAs might well not have the same variation. The geographical differences
and their sources are discussed in Jerry Cromwell et al., Sources of Hospital Cost Varia-
tion by Urban-Rural Location, 25 MEDICAL CARE 801 (1987); W. Pete Welch, Defining
Geographic Areas to Adjust Payments to Physicians, Hospitals, and HMOs, 28 INQUIRY
151 (1991); W.P. Welch, Improving Medicare Payments to HMOs: Urban Core Versus
Suburban Ring, 26 INQUIRY 62 (1989).
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terns in the urban core and lower rents, wages, and other costs
of doing business in rural areas.1°5
The geographical pressures on the system, therefore,
would come not so much in fights between suburbs and cities as
in fights pitting rural areas and suburbs against inner cities. If
the current Medicare experience were to continue in a re-
formed system, rural residents might have health coverage
costs up to 20 % lower than their urban and suburban neigh-
bors. This conflict would lead to very different political battles
than these foreseen. What would these battles look like?
Note first that this issue would not exist for all states.
Smaller states, those with fewer than, for example, three mil-
lion inhabitants, might never consider setting up more than one
health alliance. In states that opted for multiple HAs, the
terms of the HSA would have affected the boundary battle.
Under the HSA, states faced only three limits on drawing HA
boundaries. First, each HA had to cover a population large
enough to give the HA an adequate market share to negotiate
effectively. Second, in setting the boundaries of HAs, a state
could not "discriminate on the basis of or otherwise take into
account race, ethnicity, language, religion, national origin,
socio-economic status, disability, or perceived health status."
And third, states could not divide any part of a "metropolitan
statistical area" contained in the state.106
The third legal requirement effectively eliminates the ur-
ban/suburban battle. Metropolitan statistical areas are now
drawn very broadly. Some of the initial concern, for example,
focused on fights between New York City and its affluent sub-
urbs. But the primary metropolitan statistical area that con-
105. Cromwell, in a very thorough analysis of Medicare data, found that only 10 to
15% of the difference in urban and rural costs for Medicare were explained by differences
in diagnoses. A full 25 to 50% of the difference came from differences in the intensity of
procedures used in similar patients - urban doctors did more things to their patients than
rural doctors did to equivalent patients. Still another third of the difference came from
higher wages in the urban setting. See Cromwell et al., supra note 104. Welch, in his 1991
article, argues that population density is the key variable affecting size, mainly through its
effects on input costs. In his 1989 article, he showed that poverty rates usually did not have
a significant effect on a region's health costs. See Welch, Defining Geographic Areas to
Adjust Payments to Physicians, Hospitals, and HMOs, supra note 104.
106. See HSA § 1202(b); supra notes 13-17 and accompanying comments.
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tains New York City also contains many of its New York sub-
urbs in Putnam, Rockland, and Westchester Counties.07
In California, the primary statistical metropolitan area
that contains South Central Los Angeles also contains Beverly
Hills and, in fact, all nine million people in Los Angeles
County. Poverty-stricken regions of San Francisco and Oak-
land are part of a primary statistical area that includes all of
the inhabitants of San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Al-
ameda, and Contra Costa Counties - more than 5.4 million
people, very few of whom live in the "inner city."10 8 And, of
course, if the third requirement were not called into play, the
second, banning a broad range of discrimination, would un-
doubtedly have been used in litigation to prevent the creation
of a poor, heavily minority "core" HA, surrounded by a rich,
largely white "suburban" HA.
But the second rule would not resolve the split between
metropolitan areas and rural areas. Nor it is clear whether the
third rule would have resolved this split. The HSA would have
forbidden states to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity,
language, religion, national origin, socio-economic status, disa-
bility, or perceived health status. In most states, rural and met-
ropolitan areas will differ in a number of those characteristics.
Rural areas are generally poorer than metropolitan ones. Their
citizens are usually older and thus might be perceived as hav-
ing a poorer health status. In some states, in the Northeast and
Midwest, for example, rural areas will be Whiter than urban
areas; in other states, the rural population might be more heav-
ily Black, as in the deep South, or Hispanic or Native Ameri-
can, as in much of the West, than the urban areas. In few, if
any, states will all those characteristics be evenly balanced be-
tween the two.
If a very strong reading were to be given to the anti-dis-
crimination provision, the issue of HA borders would have been
moot - each state would have to have just one HA. Under a
more relaxed test, separate HAs, and hence lower premiums,
might be questioned only where the state's metropolitan areas
107. The New York portion of its CMSA adds Dutchess, Nassau, Orange, and Suf-
folk Counties. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 17.
108. Id.
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(urban and suburban combined) had much higher minority
populations than the rural areas.
If the legal challenges did not arise, the issue over which
rural areas, if any, would be allowed to enjoy lower rates than
the metropolitan areas would be a function of the balance of
power between rural and metropolitan areas in the relevant
state legislatures. Unlike the political civil war between suburbs
and inner cities envisioned by critics, this battle seems of little
concern. It would be resolved either by equal rates for all state
residents, as part of one big HA, or lower rates for rural
residents.
3. Health Plan as a Tax, Benefit, or Market Transaction
The real equity question runs deeper than one of discrimi-
nating among cities, suburbs, and rural areas. Why should any
Americans pay a different amount for identical health coverage
based on where they live? This question goes to the heart of
ambivalent status of health coverage under the Clinton plan: Is
mandatory health coverage a tax, a government entitlement, or
a market commodity?
In effect, the Clinton plan would have combined a compli-
cated tax with an individual's choice among several benefit
packages. The individual's employer would generally pay 80%
of the cost of the average-priced plan in her HA, the equivalent
of an oddly computed employer payroll tax, while the individ-
ual would pay the remainder, through her choice among plans
of different cost, as a partially voluntary employee payroll tax.
An individual without an employer would be covered with a
different set of payment percentages, as would a person em-
ployed but with a very low income.109
But those costs - in essence, the payroll taxes - would
vary not only with the individual's choices but from HA to HA,
both within and between states. Should a person in Cleveland
pay more for health coverage than one in Omaha or in Cincin-
nati? There seems no definitive way to answer that question,
but it may help to put it into context.
If the HSA were thought of entirely as a tax, it would face
a norm, one that, to some extent, has constitutional force. The
109. HSA § 1006.
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Constitution deals with the uniformity of taxes in two places.
Article I, Section 2, clause 3, states that "[representatives and
direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States...
according to their respective numbers .... -110 More impor-
tantly, the Uniformity Clause, Article 1, Section 8, clause 1
provides that "[t]he Congress shall have the power to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises to pay the debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uni-
form throughout the United States." And in practice, the ma-
jor sources of federal revenue - the personal income tax, the
corporate income tax, the gift and estate tax, social security
and Medicare taxes, the various excise taxes, and others - ap-
ply on equal terms in every state. Californians do not face a
different marginal tax rate than Texans.
Of course, this even-handedness is only nominal. In fact,
citizens of different states may face substantially different and
real federal tax effects depending on their state of residence.
For example, state income tax payments, but not state sales tax
payments, are deductible from federal personal income tax.",
In a state with a high income tax and a low sales tax, residents
will pay less federal tax than similar taxpayers in a state that
raised the same total revenue with a high sales tax and no in-
come tax. All other things being equal, the average taxpayer
will pay federal income tax at a higher rate in richer states
than in poorer ones, and less income tax in a state with high
110. The apportionment requirement for direct taxes rarely has been called into
play. Direct taxes have been held to be taxes that fall directly on property, real or personal,
and on income, at least since the Supreme Court invalidated the second federal income tax
in Pollack v. Farmers L. & T. Co., 157 U.S. 558 (1895). Taxes on transactions, even on
property involved in transactions, have been held not to be "direct" taxes. See, e.g.,
Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929). The Sixteenth Amendment reversed the Pol-
lack decision, providing "[t]he Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVI. Thus, the
current income tax is not subject to the apportionment requirement, nor are social security
taxes, as they also are "income" taxes. Krzyske v. Commissioner, 548 F. Supp. 101 (D.
Mich.), affd, 740 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1982).
Presumably, even if the HSA were held to impose taxes, those taxes generally would
be characterized as income taxes and hence not subject to the apportionment requirement.
Whether the premiums required of the unemployed or those without incomes would be held
to be direct taxes could be a complicated question, requiring assessment of some quite old
precedents. In light of the demise of the HSA, the issue seems not worth pursuing.
111. 26 U.S.C. § 164(2), (3).
19951
HEALTH MATRIX
housing prices (and mortgage interest payments) than in a
state with low prices. The effects of such contingencies outside
the tax law have not been held to violate the Uniformity Clause
of the Constitution. These effects do not lead to much
controversy.
Nor have taxes that, on their face, varied. In the Head
Money Cases,"' the Court upheld against a uniformity claim a
tax on immigrants that applied only at ports, not at inland
places of entry. In Knowlton v. Moore,113 the Court upheld
against a similar attack a progressive tax on legacies. The
Court has even upheld taxes that varied expressly in different
states. In United States v. Ptasynski, Congress had expressly
singled out oil wells in certain parts of Alaska for special treat-
ment under the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax. The Supreme
Court held that this discrimination was justified because those
parts of Alaska had special characteristics that made drilling
wells particularly expensive. Such legitimate discrimination
was not made unconstitutional, because Congress used the
well's location as part of the description of these special
wells.1 " If Congress passed something called a health insur-
ance payroll tax that varied from state to state with the states'
differing health care costs, presumably it also would pass con-
stitutional muster under the Uniformity Clause. It might well,
however, be seen as violating the strong norm of uniformity.
Since the HSA is viewed not as a tax program but as an
entitlement, the issue of uniformity becomes somewhat more
clouded. In general, federal benefit programs are uniform
across the country in one of two ways. Where the federal bene-
fit is cash or its equivalent, the amounts paid are identical.
Where the federal benefit is in kind, the amounts provided and
the prices charged usually are identical even though the costs
may differ substantially from area to area. For example, Social
Security, Supplemental Security Income, and veterans benefits
are the same to otherwise similarly situated recipients, whether
they live in expensive or inexpensive states. The same is true of
pensions for federal employees, both military and civilian.
112. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
113. 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
114. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85 (1983).
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On the other hand, a person in rural Montana gets much
more expensive postal service for the same first class stamp as a
person in Chicago. Health services provided by the Veterans
Administration or the Indian Health Service may be more or
less available in some regions, but carry the same price to the
eligible consumer whatever the local price of providing health
care. Similarly, the payroll tax paid to support Medicare Part
A is the same 2.9 % throughout the country. The premium in-
dividuals must pay to enroll in Medicare Part B is the same
throughout the country. Medicare has the same deductibles,
copayments, and annual cap for all recipients, whether they
live in a region with high or low health care costs, and the ben-
efits package is essentially identical in every region of the coun-
try.115 This parallel is true even though Medicare's methods for
reimbursing providers, both hospitals and physicians, include
regional factors that make some regions high-cost or low-cost.
In all of these examples, people otherwise identically situated
will pay the same amount to receive the identical services from
the government, but at different costs to the government.
Yet, many federal benefit programs are administered as
joint federal-state programs. Payments in (and eligibility for)
those programs vary substantially from state to state. Both
Medicaid and AFDC, for example, are administered largely by
state governments, within broad federal guidelines. Within fed-
eral guidelines, the states set their own income and asset levels
for eligibility for these programs and set their own levels of
benefits.16 These figures, once set, remain the same within the
state. An AFDC family in California will receive a very differ-
ent welfare check and participate in a very different Medicaid
program than a similar family in Alabama, but one living in
expensive San Francisco would receive the same welfare check
115. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395e (deductibles and coinsurance), 1395d (Part A bene-
fits), 1395k (Part B benefits) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-2
(1988). The regional financial intermediaries who handle much of Medicare's administra-
tion do have some discretion to make regional decisions whether particular services, argua-
bly experimental or not medically necessary, are covered. This leads to a few minor varia-
tions between regions, although those variations often will be resolved by a central decision
to cover or not cover the services for all regions.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (1396a & Supp. V 1993); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS. MEDICAID: INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRENDS AND OPTIONS (1992).
19951
HEALTH MATRIX
and participate in the same health program as one living in
relatively inexpensive Fresno.
If the HSA were viewed as a fully federal benefit, it would
normally have been provided on the same terms across the
country. But it had a significant component of state operation,
though markedly less than either Medicaid or AFDC, and it
would charge different "prices" for the same services depend-
ing on one's location. It seemed to follow no precedent very
closely. Viewed as an entitlement program, its treatment of re-
gional disparities would break new ground.
The health plans required under the HSA also would look
like the results of market transactions. Unlike most federal pro-
grams, the consumer would get a choice of options, each pro-
vided by private, and often for-profit, competitors. " 7 In this re-
spect, it resembles the Federal Employee Health Benefits Plan
(FEHBP). The FEHBP provides federal employees and retirees
with health insurance. " 8 The government, as employer, makes
a contribution generally equal to 60 % of the average charges
to a defined group of offered plans." 9 Covered employees and
retirees may then choose among a large number of plans. A
few of the plans, such as a Blue Cross/Blue Shield indemnity
plan, are available throughout the country. These plans bear
the same price everywhere in the country. Most of the plans
are available only in particular states or localities; these plans
set their own, widely varying prices after negotiation with the
government. As a result, health plans in high-cost areas also
will be more expensive than those in low-cost areas, although
the government's contribution to the costs will remain the
same. In the FEHBP, as in other settings that are, or look like,
market transactions, price differences are generally not troub-
ling. If gasoline costs more in Chicago than in Houston, so be
it.
On the other hand, where the federal government is in-
volved, geographic uniformity can enter into even market trans-
actions. For many years, the federal pay scale, the "GS" sys-
tem, did not vary with geography, but paid all federal
employees at the same grade the same amount. Recently, the
117. See HSA § 1003.
118. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
119. See 5 U.S.C. § 8906(b)(1) (1988) (describing the calculation of the federal
contributions).
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system has adjusted to allow supplemental payments for people
in a few particularly expensive cities - New York, Los Ange-
les, and San Francisco - but it has not generally adopted geo-
graphical variations, regardless of differences in either the mar-
ket wage or the cost of living.
The foregoing discussion of uniformity in federal govern-
ment functions is based solely on casual empirical observations.
Those observations merely describe current government activi-
ties; they do not provide a framework for judging whether it is
proper. There seems to be no literature or theory on the uni-
formity, or lack thereof, of federal government actions. The
HSA's complex blend of taxes, benefits, and market transac-
tions would likely be hard to square with any such theory. In-
terestingly, although nearly everything about the HSA was
controversial, including its provision for different prices within
a state, the issue of differences among states seems to have
been largely ignored. This may be because the plan looked
enough like either market transactions or a joint federal-state
program to seem familiar. And yet, what is the justification for
having residents of different states or regions pay more or less
for this governmentally-required health coverage?
There seem to be no strong arguments either for or against
different rates. Consider an alternative scheme. Every HA
would charge employers and employees the same average
amount - for example, $300 per month for family coverage.
The various plans bidding for customers within an HA would
bid based on the real reimbursement they expected, but these
bids would be transformed into "prices" to the consumers.
Those prices would differ from the national average price by
the same percentage that the plans' bids varied from the aver-
age within the HA. Thus, in a high cost area, the average
"real" bid for family coverage might be $350, with a high of
$400 and a low of $300. Consumers would see an average price
of $300, with a high of $343 and a low of $257. (In a low-cost
area, the actual bids would be below the prices seen by con-
sumers.) Consumers would choose among plans in part based
on these prices, and they and their employers would make pay-
ments to the HA based on these prices. The plans, however,
would be reimbursed by the HAs based on the "real" prices
they bid.
As a result, HAs in high-cost areas would take in too little
money to pay their bills; HAs in low-cost areas would take in
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too much. Therefore, there would have to be some kind of reve-
nue-sharing mechanism between HAs. Some such mechanism
was already contemplated for out-of-area services; modifying it
to make these equalizing transfers should be complex but not
enormously difficult. Is there any good reason to prefer the
HSA system, with different costs to consumers in different re-
gions, to this more uniform system?
Apart from unusually murky arguments about fairness,
the HSA rule would seem to be supported by two points. The
first, and more general, is that the price system works best to
allocate goods and services efficiently when consumers face the
full marginal price of what they purchase. With the uniform
payments system, consumers in high-cost states would have in-
centives to buy too much health coverage; those in low-cost
states would have incentives to buy too little. The application of
these kinds of market principles to purchasing health coverage,
however, must be largely rejected in order to justify mandatory
universal health coverage at all, particularly with a uniform
benefits package.
The second argument would point out that the uniform
payments solution removes pressure on high-cost areas to be-
come low-cost areas. When the costs of medical care are paid
fully by a region, a high-cost region will become less attractive
to employers or employees than a low-cost region. This kind of
"inter-regional" competition, however, has been operating
under the present system. While such competition has sparked
some recent collaborative employer efforts to control regional
health costs, it is too early to predict the success of such ar-
rangements.2 0 In any event, competitive pressures would still
exist within each region as every plan tried to become more
attractive. Given such direct pressures, the more indirect re-
gional pressures seem insubstantial.
Based on this discussion, should the premiums for health
plans be regionally uniform or not? Would the HSA's reformed
health system have been a tax, a government benefit, or a mar-
120. See Ron Winslow, Market Forces are Starting to Produce Significant Cuts in
Health Care Costs, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1994, at A2 (discussing hard bargaining by
companies who have joined together to increase their market power); see also Dana Priest,
Try Modest Approaches to Cutting Health Care Costs, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1992, at DI
(describing how a coalition of small Cleveland businesses have acted as a united front to
obtain significantly lower rates).
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ket transaction? Is it a federal program or a federal-state pro-
gram? There seems to be little practical reason to choose be-
tween the alternatives. A new attempt at comprehensive health
reform should consider the equities, and politics, of having re-
gional HAs that charge national rates.
C. Controlling Health Care Costs
Although it was often overlooked in the debate over re-
form, the Clinton plan was not merely about covering the
thirty-nine million uninsured, but was equally aimed at con-
taining, or at least slowing, the constant increase in expendi-
tures on health care. HAs clearly played a major role in such
cost control under the HSA, but the exact nature of that role
varied depending on who was talking. Someone looking for an
efficient agent to "unleash" competitive pressures saw a very
different role for HAs than someone seeking countervailing mo-
nopsony power to force concessions from the health insurance
industry. Ironically, the bill that resulted from the conflict over
these ideals, plus the inevitable compromises of politics, satis-
fied neither view.
The Clinton plan had two main approaches to controlling
costs. First, it relied upon the HA structure to force down
prices from insurers. In the event that did not work, the HSA
provided for "back up" controls on the health coverage premi-
ums within HAs. The second approach was consistently touted
as a back-up, to be implemented only if the HAs failed. 12 1
But the HAs could be used to implement two different so-
lutions to high and increasing costs, based on different under-
standings of "the problem." Under the first approach, which
may be called the "good broker" solution, consumer pressures
would constrain health care prices once consumers were able to
make informed choices and had a financial incentive to choose
prudently. Today, it is argued, consumers lack choices, infor-
mation, and financial incentives, all of which combine to make
the markets fail. HAs would make sure that the consumers
were well-informed about price, access, and quality. They also
121. This position was not always taken at face value. See, e.g., Alain C. Enthoven
& Sara J. Singer, Single Payer in Jackson Hole Clothing, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1994, at
81 (criticizing the HSA for "placing the federal budget at risk" by attempting to achieve
universal coverage and control costs with price controls on health plan premiums).
19951
HEALTH MATRIX
would be the mechanism through which consumers choose their
plans. The standard benefit package would help consumers to
compare the costs of health plans directly. The statutory pre-
mium structure would give almost all consumers a direct, out-
of-pocket financial interest in the cost of health coverage. The
result would be cost savings courtesy of Adam Smith's invisible
hand, once guided by the managed part of managed
competition.
The other approach, the "countervailing power" solution,
posits a different and deeper market failure. Under this view,
insurers and providers reap inappropriate returns as a result of
market power.12 2 Consumers would never be able to make good
choices about the price and quality of health care and would
probably never want to. Instead, they would be convinced by
doctors or insurers to pay whatever was necessary to keep their
existing health coverage. Merely making the health coverage
market more competitive would not work, just as increased
competition over the preceding decade has not noticeably
slowed the growth of health expenditures as a percentage of
gross domestic product. Under this theory, costs could only be
controlled by coercion, forcing insurers and providers to dis-
gorge profits and cut costs.
This coercion could be exercised by direct price controls,
but need not be. Instead, one could build up market power on
the other side, through pulling consumers together into one
large buying organization. If that organization had a large
enough share of the market, insurers and providers would be
forced to deal with it - after all, neither hospitals nor doctors
can quickly and easily change states. Its large share of the
market would make it a monopsonist, a monopoly on the
purchasing side. And its monopsony power could be used to
force down prices without resorting to price controls.
Monopsony, though, has its disadvantages. It can coerce
lower prices, but with no guarantee that the new lower prices
will be "right." Given the near impossibility under the HSA of
escaping from the grasp of the HAs, insurers or providers faced
with a monopsonist would have to accept its terms or find a
122. These surplus profits might take the form of insurer profits, open or hidden.
They also might flow back to providers, through high medical incomes or particularly good
working conditions.
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different business. The resulting prices might well be "too low,"
thus not providing for the long term marginal costs of deliver-
ing care and, in effect, forcing some health plans or providers
either to operate at a loss or to "ration" care inappropriately,
thereby compromising quality.2 3 In this respect, monopsony
power can function like a price control, but without the obvious
governmental action or the judicial review the Constitution
may require for price control schemes.
The good broker approach requires that the HA be knowl-
edgeable about the terms and quality of the health plans with
which it contracts. This approach presumably requires that the
HA reach a certain size to justify the investment in gaining
expertise. The countervailing power approach, however, re-
quires both a substantial market share, to give the HA the ef-
fective power to dictate terms to health plans, and the right to
use it. The HSA was consistent in allowing the good broker
approach to work, but contained contradictory, and even per-
verse, provisions from the point of view of the countervailing
power approach.
Under the HSA, HAs had to negotiate with any state-cer-
tified prepaid health plans that wanted to enter discussions with
them (and that had not previously failed to meet the HAs'
quality standards). In those negotiations, however, the HAs
had to accept contracts from any qualified plans that submitted
bids no more than 120 % of the average of the bids the HA
received.' 2 ' What would those negotiations have looked like?
As long as the health plan came in within 20 % of the regional
average, the HA had to offer it to recipients. Under these cir-
cumstances, over time there would have been substantial up-
ward pressure on that average - if all the plans submit bids
20 % above the previous average, the actual average becomes
20% higher than before, which leaves more room for higher
bids next year.
Currently, employers can decide to accept or reject offers
from health plans. And both PERS and HIPC can decide
whether or not to contract with particular plans, based on con-
siderations of price or quality. Two years ago, as discussed
123. Clark Havighurst suggested that the monopsony power of health alliances
might be limited by tailored antitrust scrutiny, similar to that provided by the Local Gov-
ernment Antitrust Act of 1984. See generally HAVIGHURST, supra note 3.
124. HSA § 1321(b).
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above, when PERS was unhappy with the rate increases pro-
posed by the Kaiser Permanente system, it froze Kaiser's
PERS enrollment. The next year, Kaiser did not offer a rate
increase to PERS; it cut the premiums. Under the HSA, HAs
would not have had that power. 12 5
The HSA also required HAs to provide fee-for-service cov-
erage options in their territories. HAs had to negotiate with
providers in order to create such plans, and the bill gave those
providers a special exemption from antitrust liability to allow
them to join together to negotiate with the HAs. But again, the
apparent negotiations would likely be meaningless. This time
the providers would have no choice - they could not, in fact,
refuse to meet an HA's terms. It is hard for doctors and impos-
sible for hospitals to change location. If an HA, which provided
coverage for all the population not covered by Medicare or cor-
porate alliances, insisted on a particular fee schedule, the fee-
for-service providers could either agree to try to make a living
from non-HA patients only, or try to move.
Thus, the HSA would have allowed the assertion of mo-
nopsony power in the fee-for-service market, but not in the
HMO market. This would have had different implications de-
pending on which approach, the good broker or countervailing
power approach, was right. If the former was correct, cost con-
trol should not be affected. Even if HAs cannot drive hard bar-
gains with prepaid health plans, HA members should force
competition by choosing the low-cost plans. But there still
would have been some perverse effects. One of the underlying
assumptions of health reform, and particularly of managed
competition, is that HMOs and other forms of prepaid care are
more efficient than fee-for-service practice. The HSA's struc-
ture, however, allowed HA's to use monopsony power to de-
press the price to consumers of fee-for-service plans but not of
prepaid plans. The result would be an artificial boost in the
allure to consumers for fee-for-service plans. 12 6
If, on the other hand, the countervailing power approach is
right,2 the failure of HAs to be given that power with respect
125. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
126. Of course, by depressing the fees in fee-for-service plans, the HAs might have
hastened the move by providers from fee-for-service practice to prepaid practice.
127. It is even possible that both approaches are right, but in different regions. In
some areas, such as California, the proliferation of health plans may have stripped the
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to prepaid plans would mean that such plans would not have
strong incentives to control their costs. Then if the cost control
targets set in the bill were not met, the "back-up" strategy of
price controls would come into effect. In any event, the stark
differences in the treatment of fee-for-service and prepaid plans
seems impossible to justify on policy grounds. 128
D. Controlling HAs
The final question about HAs may be the most important
how should they be controlled? The Clinton plan left that
largely up to the states. It required a controlling board, with
representatives of named interests and with strong prohibitions
on conflicts of interest, but it specified little else about control
of HA activities. 129 Yet HAs, like any other organization, could
be run well or run poorly. They could be operated based on the
desires of any of many different interested parties. The HSA
should have been concerned about two possibilities: either that
an HA would be incompetent, or that it would be competent,
but that it would pursue the interests of parties other than its
members. The HSA contained no effective checks on either
threat.
HAs could be controlled in at least four possible ways:
through federal oversight, through litigation, through a govern-
ance process run by members, or through competition. In re-
viewing these four approaches, only the third and fourth op-
tions seem promising.
1. Federal Oversight
Federal oversight and intervention could guarantee that
HAs would adequately represent their members. There are two
problems with such an approach, however.
First, federal oversight is difficult, both practically and po-
litically. Judging the quality of HAs, like judging the quality of
plans of any market power, so that only the good broker approach is needed. In other parts
of the country, where managed care is rare and one or two plans control the majority of the
market, the countervailing power approach may be essential.
128. It seems likely that the requirement that HAs accept any health plan bid that
was not more than 20% above the regional average had political, rather than policy roots,
as an attempt to mitigate opposition to the HSA from prepaid health plans terrified of the
HAs' potential exercise of monopsony power.
129. HSA §§ 1202, 1330.
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medical care, would likely be difficult. A federal agency may
not find it easy to determine whether the HA responds to mem-
ber telephone calls in a timely manner, whether it negotiates
competently with health plans, or whether it has been captured
by industry interests. Even if a federal agency made an accu-
rate determination that an HA was not being run well, it might
face political difficulties in openly accusing a state body of in-
competence or bias.
These problems would have been magnified under the
HSA, because it provided the federal government with only a
crude tool to control HAs. Presumably, the federal government
could have intervened to stop clear violations of the federal
statute governing HAs, such as including physicians on the HA
board. But the HSA seemed to give fewer options for dealing
with an incompetent or biased HA. The federal government
could have decertified a state and barred it from participating
in the national health plan entirely. However, that threat is al-
most like the threat of a first nuclear strike - too drastic to
use.130 As a result, effective federal oversight is hard to imagine
within the HSA.
2. Litigation
Another possible control on HA actions would have been
through litigation, whether by citizens or by the federal govern-
ment. Under the HSA, individuals complaining about the HAs'
performance first would have had to pursue their administra-
tive remedies. After exhausting those remedies, the potential
plaintiffs could then sue an HA in state or federal court.131
But what standards would the courts enforce? Apart from
the fairly mechanical tests for board membership, conflict of
interest rules, and so on, there were few clear statutory man-
dates in the HSA to form the bases for such suits. The statute
seemed to contain no hook that would allow plaintiffs to sue to
force HAs to act more competently or to reflect better the in-
terests of their members. Not only did the bill give little justifi-
130. One could, however, view the back-up premium limits contained in the Clinton
plan as a method of solving one manifestation of incompetent HAs. If the HA failed,
through incompetence or capture, to hold down costs, the federal government, in effect,
would take over the price negotiation function of the HA through imposition of the pre-
mium caps. This takeover would be only partial and its cure worse than the disease.
131. HSA § 5237(b).
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cation for judicial oversight of HA management, but courts
would likely be reluctant to get deeply involved in the day-to-
day operations of such large entities, operating in such a com-
plex field. Running a state's HAs could make school desegrega-
tion ligation look easy by comparison.
3. Governance Structures
HAs should be run for the benefit of their members to
make high-quality care available at reasonable prices. But
under the HSA those members had no control over the HAs.
HAs were to be governed by a board, consisting of equal num-
bers of representatives of employers and HA members. The ap-
pointment of the board members was left up to the state, as
was the staffing of the HA. As a result, sympathetic governors
or legislators in some states might have appointed board mem-
bers who are favorable to doctors, or to hospitals, or to HA
members. The HA staff may have been newly hired or hired
away from existing state bureaucracies. These decisions likely
would effect how well HAs function by affecting to whom HA
board members owe their jobs.
There are other possibilities not explored in the Clinton
plan.132 Rather than allowing HA boards to become another
patronage possibility for state governors or legislatures, the fed-
eral government might require, for example, that board mem-
bers be elected by the members of the HA. HAs might be re-
quired to provide regular reports to their members, including
cost and customer satisfaction comparisons with other
jurisdictions.
Other paths for member control are also possible. HAs
could be required to put controversial issues up for a vote of the
members or to create a committee structure with public partici-
pation. Alternatively, HA boards could be required to include
representatives of interests defined more narrowly than those of
employers and employees. None of these methods can be guar-
anteed to work, however. The majority of HA members may
not care enough to take part in such an election, let alone to
learn enough to have an informed position on HA policy or
board membership. These kinds of structures for greater mem-
132. Havighurst has described in more detail the idea of member-elected boards gov-
erning HAs. See HAVIGHURST, supra note 3.
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ber control over HAs are not inconsistent with the Clinton
plan. State legislatures and governors could choose to have HA
board members elected, in constituencies or in one state wide
election, but the Clinton plan neither required nor even en-
couraged such experimentation.
4. Competition
The final possibility for exerting some control over HAs
lies in opening them up to competition. The HSA explicitly
ruled out direct competition by requiring each HA to have its
own inclusion area within which no other HA could operate.'13 3
The bill did provide for some limited competition, however, and
other competition might be created.13 4
Corporate alliances might emerge as a competitor to HAs.
The HSA authorized individual employers or unions, in some
circumstances, to continue to buy health plans for their work-
ers. In each case, corporate alliances were only allowed if more
than 5000 employees were covered.13 5 It is very difficult to tell
how many employers would sponsor corporate alliances. Even
the number of Americans who work at firms of more than 5000
employees is not definitively known. The statistical data that
addresses workforce numbers all seem to stop at employers
with more than 5000 employees. Based on available figures for
larger employers, it seems likely that somewhere between ten
million and twenty-five million Americans work for firms that
could institute corporate alliances.13 6
133. An underlying premise of the entire HSA is that direct competition would not
be encouraged.
134. Id. § 1325. This consumer information and marketing section of the HSA
would allow enrollees to make "valid comparisons among alliance health plans," thus al-
lowing some limited competition.
135. HSA §§ 1311 (b), (e)(2). Local, state, and federal government employers were
not allowed, under the bill, to form corporate alliances. Their employees had to be covered
through the HA.
136. The best assessment of the number of people employed in workforces of differ-
ent sizes comes from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. The 1994 edition
showed that in 1991, the latest year for which data was available, 12.2 million Americans
were employed by employers with more than 1000 employees; 6.33 million were at employ-
ers with more than 500 and fewer than 1000 employees; and 22.37 million were at employ-
ers with more than 100 and fewer than 500 employees. U S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra
note 17, at 546. The abstract does not provide an estimate for employers with more than
5000 employees.
Even if the HSA had provided that employers with more than 1000 employees could
form corporate alliances, the number of people who might be covered would still be un-
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Those workers, and their households, formed the upper
limit to the size of corporate alliances under the HSA, but the
bill made it unlikely that limit would ever be reached. Under
the HSA, corporate alliances did not seem likely to attract
many employers or unions. Firms wishing to create or maintain
a corporate alliance would have had to pay a 1 % fee. 13 7 The
sponsors were to be subjected to more stringent federal regula-
tion than they are currently. The corporate alliances also would
constantly have to worry about future regulatory changes that
would make their separate existence more burdensome. In ex-
change, the sponsors forming corporate alliances would retain
more control over employees' health care, plus obtain rates that
reflected the experience of their workers' families, instead of all
families within the HA.
Corporate alliances are not the only way to inject some
competition into HAs. Clinton's health plan could allow more
than one HA to operate in an area. Certainly, some areas have
populations large enough to support several HAs. The Los An-
geles PMSA includes nearly nine million people; the portions of
the New York PMSA located in New York State have about
eleven million people. It is hard to see why those areas could
not support two or three HAs of sufficient size to reap all the
economics of sale.
Groups, public or private, nonprofit or for-profit, could ap-
ply for recognition as HAs. Those groups would then negotiate
with health plans and compete with each other for members.
Each person would still have to belong to an HA, but the indi-
vidual consumer could choose which HA she wanted.' 3 8 Con-
known. Unions that currently have health plans with more than 5000 members could con-
tinue them. It is not known how many employees are involved in such plans. One also
would need to know how many employees with family members with other jobs would opt
for HA coverage rather than corporate coverage. Finally, one would have to estimate the
average number of people covered for each employee -- spouses and dependents. Taking all
these uncertainties into account, I am unable to come up with a narrower range than about
10 million to 25 million.
137. HSA § 7121(a).
138. Alternatively, one could let the employer choose the HA for all its employees.
The employer would have financial incentives to choose the HA with the less expensive
plans. The employer would not have a strong incentive to choose HAs that provided good
member service or excelled in medical quality control, two areas where individual HA
members might have strong feelings. On the other hand, employers might be able to assess
the general quality of the HAs more effectively than individual HA members could. In
addition, it would certainly be simpler for the employers if each employer had to deal with
only one HA.
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sumers could vote with their feet, deserting HAs that did not
seem to be serving their interests for HAs that would meet
their needs.
Multiple alliances, whether corporate alliances or other
HAs, seem to offer substantial benefits in terms of control and
incentives. However, they also would carry some costs. One is
that the alliances may be too small to operate efficiently or,
under a countervailing power theory, to serve as effective
monopsonists. 189 The existence of multiple alliances also would
be confusing, a particularly high cost when trying to pass or
implement this kind of legislation.
If the benefits outweighed the costs, what kind of competi-
tive alliances should be allowed? Competing HAs are prefera-
ble to a mix of HAs and corporate alliances for two reasons:
they produce more direct competition and they are fairer.
First, the competition between HAs and corporate alli-
ances would be too indirect. Only families with multiple work-
ers, some working for companies with corporate alliances and
others not, would be able to change between corporate alliances
and HAs. Other families generally could not shift between an
HA and a corporate alliance without someone in the family
changing jobs. Nor could employers easily change. Under the
HSA, employers were not allowed to shift from an HA to a
corporate alliance, but only in the opposite direction. 40 With-
out the fear of direct competition for members, the force of
competition is limited to its "yardstick" effect - it gives one
organization a standard with which it may measure itself. The
yardstick may be hard to read as the alliance costs are affected
by the health status of their members. Its effects may be too
attenuated to keep alliances focused on the interests of their
members.
Second, different alliances necessarily presuppose different
premium rates. Each alliance would negotiate its own rates and
would be a different community for purposes of the required
community rating. But those differences open the possibility of
139. Arguably, if monopsony power were that important, one or more HAs would
grow to the size necessary to be able to exert that power. That process could take some
very valuable time.
140. HSA § 1312(d) (putting strict time limits on when an employer or a union
could choose to have a corporate alliance), § 1313 (allowing corporate alliances to choose
to dissolve).
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risk selection. If a region had two HAs, one with healthy peo-
ple and one with sick people, their members could pay strik-
ingly different premiums. That kind of difference could not be
sustained in a multiple HA system where consumers (or their
employers) could choose freely between HAs. Those in the
high-cost HA would always want to shift to the lower-cost HA.
On the other hand, corporate alliances, by their nature, restrict
entry to those associated with the employer. A firm that had
workers with low health costs would have a corporate alliance,
all other things being equal, with low premiums. Unlike the
situation with competing HAs, the employer could maintain
that advantage by shutting out non-employees who wanted to
join to receive the lower premiums. Corporations with low-cost
work forces would thus share lower health bills with those work
forces, disturbing the horizontal equity the alliance system
offers.
Competing alliances offer some possible benefits, with
competing HAs a preferable option to "competition" between
HAs and corporate alliances. Concerns about the size of the
competing HAs could be mitigated by initially testing this kind
of competition within a limited number of competing HAs re-
gions with large populations. If successful, the experiment
could be expanded to other areas.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF HAs
HAs were a fascinating but flawed part of the Clinton
health plan. The argument that they would add to the federal
bureaucracy contributed unfairly to the Clinton plan's demise,
but, in some form, HAs seem likely to survive its death. As the
PERS and HIPC examples suggest, HAs are too useful to die.
By pooling large numbers of health coverage buyers, HAs
make it possible for individuals to get expert help in negotiat-
ing, monitoring, and understanding their health plans.
Without broad federal legislation, they will expand, but
they will do so slowly. For reasons of both credibility and possi-
ble protection from antitrust liability, HAs are likely to grow
mainly under the auspices of state governments. As HAs
threaten the financial interests of many involved in the health
care industry, state adoption and sponsorship may be thwarted
by state politics.
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When substantial federal health reform does come to pass,
HAs will be a very attractive method for implementing the re-
forms. Private HAs should be encouraged as an option, along
with state-controlled HAs, with the role of HAs in reducing
bureaucracy in health care made clearer. HAs should be al-
lowed to cross state lines, at least within metropolitan areas.
HAs should be allowed to say "no" to health plans instead of
being forced to offer all plans within 20% of the average pre-
mium. More direct consumer influence on and even control
over HAs should be considered. And corporate alliances should
be abandoned and replaced, at least experimentally in some
large regions, by competing HAs. These changes should pro-
duce HAs that are more politically palatable and more
effective.
Like the Health Security Act, old Marley really was dead.
And yet his ghost, and the lessons it provided, accomplished the
most unlikely task of reforming Ebenezer Scrooge. May the
ghost of the HSA, and its mandatory health alliances, be as
successful in leading to reform of our health care financing
system.
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